I am one of the
few people happy about the University of Maryland’s move from the Atlantic
Coast Conference (ACC) to the Big Ten Conference (Big Ten). Having grown up in
Maryland and attended Northwestern University, I am excited to see football
games between the Terrapins and Wildcats in either of the two smallest football
stadiums in the Big Ten.
For most sports fans and media members, however, the moves by Maryland
and Rutgers University (who is leaving the Big East) to the Big Ten conference
seem like little more than “money
grab”. More specifically, both the schools and the conference want to make
more money through the Big Ten Network. Started in 2007, the Big Ten network
provided each conference school (except for Nebraska this year) with $24.7 million in revenue
this year.
While B6A
has often advocated for sports organizations maximizing all potential
revenue streams, I recognize that strategic decisions cannot be made in a
vacuum. Sports managers and decision makers need to gauge how attempts to make
more money will impact their brands and via reactions by fans, boosters, sponsors,
media, and employees. The damage caused by the vehement opposition by fans and
the media to the school’s brand is the main argument against Maryland’s move to
the Big Ten. The school was a founding member of the ACC when the conference
was created in 1953. In addition, basketball games with Duke
University and the University of North Carolina have created some of the
Maryland's most iconic athletic moments. It does not make sense to many Maryland
fans to jettison these games to play schools like Northwestern or the
University of Iowa.
Both the
brand and revenue arguments, however, are questionable at best and flawed at worst. From
a brand perspective, Maryland was already less likely to play its “rival”
schools given the ACC’s recent expansion to 14 schools. Maryland’s protected
rival (i.e. the school it would be guaranteed to play in all conference games)
was the University of Pittsburgh. Since Pitt only recently joined the ACC in
2011, Maryland really has no history in competing with the school. In fact, Maryland’s
stronger academic, recruiting, and athletic rival is probably Pennsylvania State
University – a school already in the Big Ten. In addition, the recent additions
of Pitt, Syracuse University, Boston College and Notre Dame (for all sports
other than football) to the ACC makes impossible for all schools to play
against each other in a football or basketball season making it games against Duke and UNC less frequent. Most importantly, not
all of the school’s core audience members are against the change. In fact,
Kevin Plank, the founder and CEO of Under Armour as well as the school’s
biggest booster, applauded
the team’s move to the Big Ten.
If the
brand argument has its flaws then what about the financial argument? That seemed
like a no brainer. Maryland is leaving the ACC primarily to make more money. While the school is likely to make more money, it is actually far from a guarantee that this will occur. The ACC
signed a new agreement with ESPN through 2027 that provides each school with
$17.1 million in revenue. The additions of Maryland and Rutgers to the Big Ten
mean that each of the 14 schools in the Big Ten would make about $20.3 million
per year per school (a $2.6 million dollar year-on-year increase for Maryland) if media rights agreements remain constant.
However, Maryland is currently required to pay a $50 million exit fee to the ACC for leaving the conference. B6A is not anticipating a significant change in the other sources revenue for Maryland by moving to the Big Ten. We do not see a great improvement in-game, sponsorship, merchandise, or event revenue based the on Maryland playing schools like the University of Michigan and The Ohio State University in football or Indiana University and Michigan State in basketball when the school already plays against nationally recognized programs like Florida State University and the University of Miami in football or Duke and North Carolina in basketball. Therefore, the school would rely on its increase in the media rights agreement to cover this costs. Because the school is only making $2.6 million more per year by leaving the ACC and joining the Big Ten, it would take over 19 years to pay off the exit fee.
However, Maryland is currently required to pay a $50 million exit fee to the ACC for leaving the conference. B6A is not anticipating a significant change in the other sources revenue for Maryland by moving to the Big Ten. We do not see a great improvement in-game, sponsorship, merchandise, or event revenue based the on Maryland playing schools like the University of Michigan and The Ohio State University in football or Indiana University and Michigan State in basketball when the school already plays against nationally recognized programs like Florida State University and the University of Miami in football or Duke and North Carolina in basketball. Therefore, the school would rely on its increase in the media rights agreement to cover this costs. Because the school is only making $2.6 million more per year by leaving the ACC and joining the Big Ten, it would take over 19 years to pay off the exit fee.
However, this
assumes that Maryland will both have to pay the full $50 million and the Big
Ten Network will not generate any increases it revenue. Neither part of the
previous statement is likely to occur. First, it appears unlikely that the
school will have to pay the full $50 million exit fee. Even though the $50
million fee is legally binding
according to sources, it can be paid over a number of years. B6A believes that
Maryland and the ACC will work out an agreement where the school will pay more
up front to leave the conference but less in overall dollars. How much is
difficult to anticipate, but we believe it will be somewhat closer to the $20
million dollar exit fee that existed for teams leaving the conference in 2011
(i.e. before the conference added four additional schools). We also think it is
unlikely that Maryland will challenge the $50 million fee in court (as has been
mention by the university’s president) and instead negotiate a lower amount in
a settlement agreement.
The larger
question is will the Big Ten Network achieve the revenue growth targets that it
is betting on by adding Maryland and Rutgers. The conference wants to make the
Big Ten Network into a national network that could compete with the likes of
ESPN and the NBC Sports Network. Adding schools like Maryland and Rutgers would
give the conference a reason for cable providers in the Washington D.C. and New
York areas to carry the Big Ten Network on their basic tiers (many carry the
network on a premium sports tier). The increase in audience would mean an
increase the carriage fees and advertising rates for the Big Ten Network as
well as increase the number of companies who want to purchase advertising time
on the channel. The addition of Maryland and Rutgers is expected to enhance the
Big Ten Network’s annual revenue by up to
$200 million (or about an additional $14.3 million per school).
While it is
likely that adding Maryland and Rutgers will increase carriage fees and
advertising revenue by some amount, it is far from certain that it will result in
a $200 million increase on an annual basis. Maryland and Rutgers are not the
universities that dominate their media markets. Maryland faces stiff competition
from the University of Virginia and Penn State from a football perspective and
Georgetown University (among others) from a basketball perspective. Rutgers
certainly is not the dominant school in the New York television market as
Syracuse and Notre Dame attract larger audiences. More importantly,
professional teams have traditionally dwarfed college teams in the Washington
and New York media markets in terms of ratings and interest.
In
addition, the Big Ten Network is not renegotiating its television contracts
until 2017. Since Maryland is joining the Big Ten Conference in 2014, it will
not see any impact of the new Big Ten television revenues for three years. If it
has to follow a similar path as the Nebraska did when it joined the Big Ten conference
in 2011 then it will also not receive the same portion of revenue as the other
current Big Ten Schools in at least its first two years in the conference. Yet,
it still has start to paying the conference exit fee likely starting ten months
before leaving the conference. Therefore, it appears the school will not recoup
its losses on its exit fee losses for at least five years after it starts making
exit payments to the ACC even if that fee is reduced from $50 million.
And what happens if the league does
not receive its estimated increases in revenue? While the sky appears to be the
limit right now for current media rights deals, it is possible that the
landscape could change over the next four years. In fact, there is an argument
to be made that media rights deals are experiencing a bubble in the same way
that the housing and technology markets experience a bubble before their
collapse. If the league receives less than a $200 million annual increase then
it could take Maryland even longer to make up the money it is losing by paying
the ACC exit fee. If the media rights deals do decline in value and the Big Ten
Network actually makes less money than in previous agreements then Maryland
could be in more troubling financial situation than it is now.
The larger of
point of this admittedly long analysis is that the popular sentiment may not
actual hold true when it comes to analyzing Maryland’s move to the Big Ten. Maryland
is unlikely to suffer the long-term damage to its brand base of its move from the
ACC. The financial impact of Maryland moving to the ACC is not the guarantee it
appears to be. The truth, like many of the universities in the Big Ten when it
comes to their geographic location in the United States, lies somewhere in the
middle.
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